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Many modern democracies have political campaign spending
limits. Walecki (2007) finds that out of 60 democracies studied, 25
have caps on political campaign spending including Canada, France,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and the UK. The Corrupt and
Illegal Practices Act of 1883 is characterized by historians as a
landmark in the development of democracy in England. The main
feature of the act is the introduction of limits on the election
expenditures permitted in each constituency. The act was expanded
in 2000 under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act. In
Canada, spending limits for political parties and candidates were first
introduced in 1974 and they were re-regulated in 2003. Spending
limits now are considered a cornerstone of Canadian democracy.1
There is general consensus that the electoral playing field is tilted in
favorof the incumbent. In the2008USHouseelections, 94%of incumbents
who chose to run for election were reelected. The average reelection rate
in USHouse election cycles from1964 to 2008was 93%. The figure for the
US Senate was 81% for the same time period. Moreover, overwhelming
empirical evidence indicates that incumbency gives an advantage in theelectoral contest.2 Political scientists have identified various channels
through which incumbency advantage may have deleterious effects on
social welfare. The office-holder may be less responsive to his constitu-
ents, since hewouldhave little reason to fear defeat. Even if the challenger
is of higher quality, he may have a smaller probability of victory than the
incumbent. High-quality candidates with high opportunity cost may be
deterred from running for office because of weak electoral prospects. The
incumbentmay not be challenged in thefirst place decreasing the choices
available to constituents.
Proponents of spending limits suggest that ceilings enhance robust
competition in the marketplace of ideas by allowing less established
candidates to be heard on an equal footing with the established
incumbents. However, others argue that incumbents would not have
legislated spending caps if limits did not serve them.3 In order to
assess the impact of ceilings on competitive balance, we analyze
whether the challengers' electoral prospects improve with a cam-
paign spending limit in line with the stated intention of campaign
spending legislation.
Proponents and opponents of political campaign spending limits
base their arguments on one of three sources of asymmetry between
the incumbents and challengers; initial voter disposition advantage,
efficiency in fundraising and effectiveness in campaign spending.antage is one of the most frequently studied issues in congres-
arch, see Gelman and King (1990).
) and Bender (1988) in the Canadian and U.S. context for some
the argument.
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disposition advantage. For example in his dissenting opinion in
McConnell v. FEC (2003),4 Supreme Court Justice Scalia writes: “If all
electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would
have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers
are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are
favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of campaign
speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends
to favor incumbents.”
The main argument in favor of spending limits focuses on
incumbents' higher efficiency in fundraising. In the US Supreme court
case McConnell v. FEC (2003), Justice Stevens argues that “[I]
ncumbents have pre-existing relationships with corporations and
unions, and groups that wish to procure legislative benefits may tend
to support the candidate who, as a sitting officeholder, is already in a
position to dispense benefits and is statistically likely to retain office.
. . . Sowe do not have a solid theoretical basis for condemning [limits] . . .
as a front for incumbent self-protection.” Limits are purported to limit
incumbent's ability to exploit this fundraising advantage.
It is also argued that spending limits affect the balance of the
electoral competition due to candidates' asymmetric effectiveness in
campaign spending. Incumbents are already known by the electorate,
whereas challengers often need to campaign just to establish name
recognition, providing an additional benefit to campaigning. There is
extensive empirical evidence demonstrating that challengers are
more effective in turning campaign spending into votes.5 Given that
challengers are more effective in campaign spending, Samuels (2001)
argues that spending limits harm challengers. Surprisingly, we find
the opposite: Spending limits can benefit challengers only if they are
more effective at campaign spending.
The theoretical literature focuses on these three sources of
asymmetry between incumbents and challengers in isolation. In
Sahuguet and Perisco (2006) candidates differ only in initial voter
disposition and the spending limit is an impediment to the underdog's
ability to overcome his initial disadvantage. Meirowitz (2008) has
results on the effect of a spending limit for the case where candidates
are asymmetric in fundraising efficiency but are symmetric in all other
dimensions. The challenger, who has lower fundraising efficiency
benefits from spending limits if voters casts their ballots in favor of the
challenger when indifferent. In this paper we adapt the electoral
contest model of Meirowitz (2008) to examine spending limits where
all three sources of asymmetry may coexist. We find that allowing for
more than one source of asymmetry leads to significant changes in the
predictions of the model.
Limits are intended to level the playing field in favor of the
candidate with lesser resources. However if the challenger does not
have greater effectiveness of campaign spending, we find that this
premise does not hold as long as the incumbent has any initial voter-
disposition advantage, however small. The limit always increases the
equilibrium probability of victory and the expected payoff of the
incumbent with the initial voter disposition advantage irrespective of
his relative fundraising efficiency. The challenger must spend more
than the incumbent to overcome the incumbent's head-start
advantage. Since the maximum the challenger can spend is given by
the limit, the incumbent never needs to spend as much as the limit.
This implies that the challenger is effectively constrained by the limit
while the incumbent is not.
However, if the challenger can turn campaign spending into votes
more effectively, we show that a moderate limit may increase the4 The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act provided for ceilings on campaign
expenditures in the US Presidential, Senate and House elections. In 1976 however, the
US Supreme Court deemed expenditure limits to be unconstitutional (Buckleyv.
Valeo).
5 Among others see Glantz et al. (1976), Jacobson (1978, 1981, 1985, 1990),Welch
(1981),Abramowitz (1988) and Green and Krasno (1988, 1990).equilibrium probability of victory and the expected payoff of the
challenger when the incumbent has a mild initial voter-disposition
advantage. The incumbent must spend more to match his rival's
effective campaign spending and a mild initial voter disposition
advantage does not overwhelm this effect. Hence with moderate
limits the incumbent is effectively constrainedwhereas the challenger
is not. Moreover, we find that the effect of a spending ceiling may be
non-monotonic; A moderate limit increases the probability of victory
and the expected payoff of the challenger, however further restricting
the limit benefits the incumbent.
While the main focus of the paper is the impact of spending caps
on incumbency advantage, we also provide an analysis of spending
limits in an open-seat contest. In our analysis of incumbency
advantage, candidates are identical in every respect other than the
incumbency status. When studying an open-seat contest however, we
let the candidates differ in quality. Assuming that the high-quality
candidate enjoys a higher degree of campaign effectiveness, a more
restrictive limit increases the win probability of the high-quality
candidate. This result holds as long as the high-quality candidate
enjoys an initial voter disposition advantage due to his prior
accomplishments, however small this advantage may be. The low-
quality candidate needs to spend more than the high-quality
candidate in order to overcome the rival's higher campaign
effectiveness. The limit hinders the ability of the low-quality
candidate to do so. The cap improves the probability of victory of
the high-quality candidate in an open-seat contest.
We show that irrespective of incumbency status, candidates'
marginal benefit to quality goes down with a more restrictive
spending cap. The higher the candidate's quality the more effective
he is in campaign spending. The spending cap restricts the ability to
take advantage of quality. Hence themore restrictive the binding limit
can weaken the incentive to invest in quality.
The paper also provides an analysis of the effect of spending limits
on expected campaign spending. It is often argued that caps can help
restrict campaign spending and reduce fundraising. Fundraising takes
time and effort and may distract politicians from their legislative
duties. Furthermore greater fundraising may lead to undue policy
influence of special interest groups. However, we find that, contrary to
one of its intentions, the imposition of stricter limits may lead to
fiercer competition and increased spending.
Finally, this paper makes a small but useful contribution to the
auction literature. In the electoral contest the winner takes the seat
but both players' costs of effort are sunk. Hence the contest takes the
form of an all-pay auction where one of the contestants has a head-
start advantage (initial voter disposition advantage). In the auction
literature terminology, the contestant with the head-start advantage
is subject to “preferential treatment”. Konrad (2002) is the first paper
to characterize the equilibrium of a preferential treatment all-pay
auction.6 Konrad (2002) is extended by Meirowitz (2008) to allow for
asymmetric marginal costs of bidding and by Pastine and Pastine
(2010) to analyze the preferential treatment all-pay auction equilib-
rium with a cap on bids. This current paper analyzes a cap in a
preferential treatment all-pay auction where contestants may be
asymmetric both in the cost of bidding and in the effectiveness of their
bids. This is non-trivial because these asymmetries and the preferen-
tial treatment interact in the presence of a cap.
2. Framework
We consider a slightly generalized version of Meirowitz (2008). In
this model, voters are “impressionable” in the terminology of
Grossman and Helpman (1996) so campaign spending is persuasive.
Voters have a predisposition toward one candidate which can be6 Also see Siegel (2010) and Kirkegaard (2010) for all-pay auctions with head-start
advantages.
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perceptions. Campaign spending enters the utility function of the
voters as in the models of persuasive advertising in consumer product
markets by Dixit and Norman (1978) and Becker and Murphy (1993).
Campaigning enhances familiarity. The more familiar a voter is with
the winning candidate, the higher the utility the voter derives from
the election result. Given their preferences the voters make their
voting decisions rationally, however the mechanism through which
spending is persuasive is left as a black box.
There is considerable evidence demonstrating that the majority of
political advertising has little direct informational content. Abrajano
and Morton (2004) find that about seventy percent of the political
advertisements in the 2000 US Congressional elections did not involve
substance. Much of political advertising attempts to create the
impression that the candidate is compassionate, honest, competent,
friendly, etc. rather than providing hard information about the policy
position of the candidates.7 In Senate campaigns from 1988 to 1992,
Kahn and Kenney (1999) report that only thirty six percent of political
advertisements made an issue a major focus. Campaign spending
provides indirect information to voters about the valence of the
candidate via signaling as in Potters et al. (1997) and Prat (2002a,b).8
However, Mueller and Stratmann (1994) argue that television
advertising is primarily persuasive and that the growth of television
advertising signifies the growth of the relative importance of
persuasive campaigning. This paper will not enter the debate on
whether the majority of campaign spending is persuasive or
informative either directly or indirectly through signaling. But rather
it takes the existence of persuasive advertising as given and focuses on
its equilibrium implications.
Two candidates indexed by i {1, 2} run for office. Candidates
simultaneously choose their campaign spending levels, ai. A contin-
uum of voters observes the spending levels and cast their ballots
based on their initial disposition toward the candidates and the
spending of the two campaigns. The outcome of the election is
determined by simple majority. Each voter's initial disposition for
Candidate 1 over Candidate 2 is i.i.d. tz∼U[−α2, α1]. So if tzb0 voter z
initially prefers Candidate 2. After observing the campaign spending
of the two candidates the voter's utility is:
uz =
tz + η1a1 if Candidate 1 wins
η2a2 if Candidate 2 wins

ð1Þ
where ηi>0 is the campaign spending effectiveness of candidate i.9
Voter z casts his vote for Candidate 1 if tz+η1a1>η2a2. If the
inequality is reversed he votes for Candidate 2. If indifferent, he flips a
coin. Since tz∼U[−α2, α1], the median voter has tz=(α1−α2)/2≡α.
Label candidates as 1 and 2 such that the majority of voters have an
initial predisposition for Candidate 1, α1>α2 so α>0. Candidate 1
wins the election if he can capture the vote of the median voter, i.e. if
α+η1a1>η2a2. Hence the parameter α gives the initial voter
disposition advantage enjoyed by Candidate 1. In case of equality,
α+η1a1=η2a2, Candidate 1 wins with probability 1/2. We refer to
α+η1a1 as the “score” of Candidate 1, and η2a2 as the “score” of
Candidate 2. Let k denote the level of the campaign spending ceiling,
so a candidate's spending cannot exceed k.7 There are well-developed theoretical models of informative political campaign
advertising. In Soberman and Sadoulet (2007) campaign advertising provides direct
information about the valence of the candidate á la Butters (1977). In Austen-Smith
(1987) and Coate (2004) campaign advertising directly informs voters about the
policy position of the candidate. Konrad (2004) has an inverse campaign model where
candidates inform voters who would lose from the policy proposals of the rival.
8 Also see Pastine and Pastine (2002) for an additional explanation for why
advertising that contains no direct information may influence its target audience.
9 All that is needed is a median voter model where voters can be influenced by
campaign spending and one candidate has a potential head-start advantage. Meirowitz
(2008) generates the same game form from a different underlying model.The value of winning the office is the same for both candidates and
is normalized to one. The marginal utility cost of raising funds for
campaign spending is denoted by βi>0. Candidates differ in their
efficiency of raising funds; the lower βi, the greater is candidate i's
efficiency of fundraising. If i wins his payoff is 1−βiai. If his opponent
wins candidate i's payoff is −βiai.
For each candidate define ai as the highest feasible spending at
which his valuation from winning is non-negative:
ai≡
1=βi if k ≥ 1= βi
k if k< 1= βi
:

ð2Þ
Define a function Mi(aj) that gives the amount candidate i must
spend to effectivelymatch the score of his rivalwhen the rival spends aj:
M1 a2ð Þ = η2a2− αð Þ= η1
M2 a1ð Þ = η1a1 + αð Þ= η2: ð3Þ
These functions are inverses of each other. Candidate 1 is referred
to as the “strong” candidate if a1≥M1(a2), where Candidate 1's
maximum feasible spending at which his valuation from winning is
non-negative exceeds what he needs to spend to effectivelymatch the
score of Candidate 2 if Candidate 2 were to engage in his highest
feasible spending at which his valuation from winning is non-
negative. Otherwise Candidate 2 is referred to as the strong candidate.
The strong candidate's rival is referred to as the “weak” candidate.
Whenever ai>Mi(aj) candidate i has the option of guaranteeing
victory and a positive payoff with spending just above Mi(aj).
This framework is a generalization of Meirowitz (2008) where we
explicitly included the candidates' degrees of effectiveness of
campaign spending. In Meirowitz (2008) without campaign spending
restrictions, β can capture an aggregate technology of fundraising and
campaign spending effectiveness. This is because in Meirowitz (2008)
ai takes the interpretation of spending measured in effective units.
However spending caps limit the face value of spending, not the
effective units. Therefore in our framework ai is the monetary value of
campaign spending and the parameters βi and ηi represent two
different sources of asymmetry. With spending limits it will be shown
that the effects of these two sources of asymmetry are distinctly
different from each other.
3. Equilibrium
If Candidate 1's initial voter disposition advantage is severe,
α ≥ η2/β2, with or without spending limits the unique equilibrium is
in pure strategies. Candidate 2 cannot overcome the head-start
advantage of the rival, even if Candidate 2 spends 1/β2 and Candidate
1 spends nothing. Hence neither candidate exerts any effort. Likewise
with a sufficiently restrictive spending limit, kbα/η2, the unique
equilibrium is in pure strategies where there is no competition. If η2
kbα, Candidate 2 cannot overcome the voters' initial disposition with
spending equal to k, even if Candidate 1 exerts no effort. Below we
describe the equilibrium for the non-trivial cases where there is
competition in equilibrium, i.e. where voter's initial disposition is not
too strong, αbη2/β2, and the cap is not too restrictive, k>α/η2. In the
interest of space we ignore the non-generic special case k=α/(η2−
η1) where Mi(k)=k.10
The victor captures the seat but both candidates' efforts are sunk.
Hence the contest has the formof an all-pay auction.With andwithout a
cap, the unique equilibrium is inmixed strategies. If Candidate 1were to10 This case is non-generic in the sense that for any given level of k, if α, η1 and/or η2
are drawn from continuous distributions there is zero probability of the case occurring.
Nevertheless it is interesting theoretically. In this non-generic case if both players
spend the maximum permitted amount they tie and the contest is decided by lottery.
Hence the equilibrium mirrors the equilibrium in Che and Gale (1998) and can be
solved using their approach.
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enough to beat the rival's score or to spend zero if that spending yields
anegative payoff or is not possible due to the spendingcap. Ineither case
a′ would not be the best response of Candidate 1.
Let Fi(x)≡prob(ai ≤ x)∀ai∈ [0, ∞) denote the cumulative distri-
bution function of candidate i in an arbitrary mixed-strategy
equilibrium and let aisup denote the supremum of the support of
each candidate's equilibriummixed strategy. Let ϑ be the larger of the
two candidates' aisup in the competition without a spending cap. A cap
is termed non-binding if k>ϑ. Otherwise the cap is binding. A more
restrictive cap refers to a smaller k when the cap is binding.
The two propositions below characterize the equilibrium of the
electoral contest. The first proposition describes the equilibrium for
parameter values where Candidate 1 is strong, a1≥M1(a2). The second
proposition describes the equilibrium for parameter values where
Candidate 2 is strong, a1 bM1(a2). The propositions are preceded by
Lemmas 1 and 2 that give the parameter values where Propositions 1
and 2 apply without a binding cap and with a binding cap, respectively.
To reduce unnecessary notation, throughout the paper define the
interval [b,c] as [0,c] whenever bb0 and as the empty set whenever
b>c or cb0. Similarly define open intervals.
Lemma 1. Non-binding campaign spending cap.
(a) if α ∈ 0; η2β2−
η1
β1
 
then ϑ=max 1β1

,M2 1β1
 
Þand k>ϑ is
not binding and a1 bM1(a2) and a
sup
1 =
1
β1
and asup2 = M2
1
β1
 
.
(b) if α ∈ η2β2−
η1
β1
; η2β2Þ
h
then ϑ=max M1 1β2
 
; 1β2
 
and k>ϑ is not
binding and a1≥M1(a2) and asup1 = M1 1β2
 
and asup2 =
1
β2
.
Proof. Appendix.
Absent a binding cap on spending, the identity of the strong
candidate depends on the degree of initial voter disposition advantage
and candidates' cost of raising funds per effective unit of spending. Here
is a sketch of the Proof of Lemma 1. Since there is no binding legal
restriction on the level of spending, each candidates' maximum
feasible spending at which the valuation from winning is non-negative
(ai) is given by 1/βi. There exists a range of α∈(0, (η2/β2−η1/β1))
whereCandidate 2 is strong a1 bM1(a2) if Candidate 2has a lower cost of
raising funds per effective unit of spending, η2/β2>η1/β1. In
other words, despite a mild initial voter disposition disadvantage,
Candidate 2 has the option of guaranteeing victory with a positive
payoff if his cost per effective unit of spending is lower. Candidate 2 is
weak ifα∈ [(η2/β2−η1/β1), η2/β2). The supremumof the support of the
weak candidate j's equilibriummixed strategy is given by 1/βj. If it were
lower than 1/βj, the strong candidate i would never spend more than
just enough to exceed the score of theweak candidate at the supremum
of j's equilibrium mixed strategy support. The weak candidate would
then have an incentive to deviate by increasing his upper bound to
guarantee a win increasing his expected payoff. Since the supremum
of the equilibrium support of the weak candidate j is given by 1/βj,
the strong candidate's supremum isMi 1βj
 
:
Lemma 2 provides conditions determining which candidate is
strong when there is a binding cap. With a binding cap asymmetries in
campaign spending effectiveness and in fundraising efficiency have
qualitatively distinct effects on the equilibrium of the contest. While
fundraising efficiency determines the maximum willingness to spend,
the variation in the effectiveness in campaign spending determines the
identity of the strong candidate when there is a binding cap.
Lemma 2. With a binding campaign spending cap (k≤ϑ):
(a) if k(η2−η1)bα then a1≥M1(a2).
(b) if k(η2−η1)>α then a1 bM1(a2).Proof. Appendix.
Candidate 1 is strong if k(η2−η1)bα. At an intuitive level, a very
restrictive binding cap limits Candidate 2's ability to overcome Candidate
1's initial voter disposition advantage. Even if Candidate2 ismore effective
in campaign spending, Candidate 2must outspend Candidate 1 to be able
to match the Candidate 1's score as long as k(η2−η1)bα. The mirror
argument is that Candidate 1 does not need to spendmore thanM1(k)bk
if Candidate 2 is restricted by the cap. Candidate 1 is therefore not
effectively restricted by the cap. This allows Candidate 1 to capture the
strong position.
If k(η2−η1)>α, however, Candidate 2 is strong. Note that this case
can only exist if Candidate 2 has higher spending effectiveness, η2>η1.
If the cap is not too restrictive, Candidate 2 can use his greater
effectiveness to capture the strong position in the competition. If
Candidate 2 were to spend k, Candidate 1 would need to outspend
Candidate 2 to match his score, but would not be permitted by law. If
Candidate 1 is restricted by k, Candidate 2 would not need to spend as
much as k, since M2(k)bk. Hence the spending cap would effectively
only constrain Candidate 1.
Note that with a binding cap, only the weak candidate j is
effectively restricted by the cap and his rival i is able to use that to
capture the strong position in the contest. If the weak candidate j is
effectively restricted by k, then the strong candidate i does not spend
more than Mi(k)bk. The reversed inequality, Mi(k)>k, would be a
contradiction of j being the weak candidate.
Proposition 1. For k>α/η2 and α∈ 0; η2β2
 
: if a1 ≥ M1(a2) then the
equilibrium is characterized by unique cumulative density functions F1
(a1) and F2(a2) for Candidates 1 and 2's campaign spending respectively:
F1 a1ð Þ = fβ2η2 α + η1a1ð Þ for a1∈ 0;M1 a2ð Þ½ 
1 for a1∈ M1 a2ð Þ;∞ð Þ
F2 a2ð Þ =
1−β1
η1
η2a2−α
 
for a2∈ 0;α = η2½ 
1−β1
η1
η2a2 +
β1η2
η1
a2 for a2∈
α
η2
; a2
 
1 for a2∈ a2;∞ð Þ
:
8>>>><
>>>>:
(a) Expected payoffs: EV1 = 1−
β1
η1
η2a2−αð Þ≥ 0, with equality only
if a1=M1 (a2), and EV2=0. (b) Expected spending: E a1ð Þ = β2η12η2
η2a2−αð Þ=η1½ 2 + 1−β2a2ð Þ η2a2−αð Þ= η1½  and E a2ð Þ = β1η22η1 ½a22−
α
η2
 	2. (c) Probability that Candidate 2 wins: prob2 = 12 β2β1η2η1
a22−
α
η2
 	2" #.
Proof. Appendix.
The equilibrium distribution functions with a binding cap are
graphed in Fig. 1. In equilibrium contestants are indifferent between
all spending levels in the support of their equilibrium strategies given
the equilibrium distribution of their rival. Since a1≥M1 (a2),
Candidate 1 is strong. He never exceeds M1 (k)+ since the weak
candidate (Candidate 2) is restricted by k, a2sup=a2=k.
Candidate 2 never spends in the range (0, α/η2) , since he needs to
spend at least α/η2 in order to overcome the initial voter disposition
advantage of Candidate 1. Both the weak and the strong candidates
have a probability mass at zero campaign spending. The probability
masses at zero are increasing in α. The higher is Candidate 1's initial
disposition advantage, the greater is the chance that Candidate 2 is
Fig. 1. Equilibrium distributions with a binding cap when Candidate 1 is strong.
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passive in campaign spending with positive probability.
Proposition 2. For k > α/η2 and α ∈ 0;
η2
β2
 	
: if a1 bM1 (a2) then the
equilibrium is characterized by unique cumulative density functions
F1(a1) and F2(a2) for Candidates 1 and 2's campaign spending
respectively:
F1 a1ð Þ =f1 − β2η2 η1 a1 + β2η1η2 a1 for a1∈ 0; a1½ 1 for a2∈ a1;∞ð Þ
F2 a2ð Þ =f 0 for a2 ∈ 0;α = η2½ β1η1 η2a2−αð Þ for a2∈ αη2 ;M2 a1ð Þ 
1 for a2∈ M2 a1ð Þ;∞ð Þ:
(a) Expected payoffs: EV1=0, and EV2 = 1−
β2
η2
η1a1 + αð Þ > 0.
(b) Expected spending: E a1ð Þ = η1β2a
2
1
2η2
and E a2ð Þ = β1a12η2 η1a1 +ð
2αÞ + 1
η2
1−β1a1ð Þ η1a1 + αð Þ. (c) Probability that Candidate 2 wins:
prob2 = 1−
1
2
β2β1η1a
2
1
η2
.
Proof. Appendix.
The equilibrium distribution functions with a binding cap are
graphed in Fig. 2. Candidate 2 is strong since a1 bM1 (a2). This case is
possible only if the initial disposition advantage of Candidate 1 is mildFig. 2. Equilibrium distributions with a binding cap when Candidate 2 is strong.and Candidate 2 is more effective in campaign spending (see Lemma 2
Part a). Candidate 2 never exceeds M2 (k)+ since Candidate 1 is
restricted by k, a1sup=a1=k. Hence the strong candidate is not
effectively restricted by the cap while the weak candidate is.
When Proposition 2 applies, note that Candidate 2's win
probability does not depend on the degree of initial voter disposition
advantage (see Proposition 2 Part c). If α increases, Candidate 2 simply
becomesmore aggressive in order to overcome his rival's greater head
start while Candidate 1's equilibrium distribution remains the same.
For parameter values where Proposition 1 applies, however, the
probability of victory does depend on the degree of initial voter
disposition advantage. The strong position of Candidate 1 allows him
to compete away all of 2's expected gains. Thus if α increases,
Candidate 2 does not become more aggressive to compensate. This
allows Candidate 1 to reduce his campaign spending and still have a
higher probability of winning than he did with a lower α.
The model implies that it may be difficult to empirically establish
whether an existing spending limit is binding. Natural intuition would
suggest that there would be a large number of political candidates who
spend the maximum permissible amount if the cap were binding. For
instance Evens (2007) reports that campaign spending limits are seldom
binding based on the fact that candidates so rarely spend at the limit.11
However a significant feature of the equilibrium is that a binding cap
alters both candidates' behavior but neither candidate has a probability
mass at the cap. Hence according to the model, these empirical
observations do not necessarily indicate that the limits are not binding.
4. Equilibrium implications
In this section we discuss the equilibrium implications of the
model for the set of parameter values that are consistent with
empirical regularities.
4.1. Incumbency advantage
When quality differences are controlled for incumbents tend to
have a higher probability of victory. Jamie et al. (2007) finds an
incumbency advantage of roughly three percent using late-nine-
teenth-century US House election data; Levitt (1994) finds an
incumbency advantage between three and four percent in US House
races from 1972 to 1990 and finds an incumbency advantage of four to
five percent points. Political science regards this incumbency
advantage as a cause of concern since the uneven playing field can
cause adverse welfare effects reducing the accountability of the
incumbent occupying a safe seat and deteriorating incoming politician
quality.
To focus on the effect of a spending limit on incumbency
advantage, we consider two candidates who are identical in every
respect except for their incumbency status. Hence asymmetries in
initial voter disposition advantage, effectiveness in campaign spend-
ing and efficiency in fundraising are driven solely by incumbency
status. We label Candidate 1 as the incumbent since empirically
incumbents tend to enjoy the initial voter disposition advantage
either due to reputations they build over their term in office or due to
their campaign activities in prior elections.12
We define the “degree of incumbency advantage” in the electoral
contest as the incumbent's probability of victory minus 1/2. Using this
definition, if the degree of incumbency advantage is positive, then
there is “incumbency advantage.”11 Combining all Canadian federal races in the 1997 and 2000 election years, Milligan
and Rekkas (2008) report that 89% of all candidates and 66% of incumbents spent less
than 90% of their spending limit.
12 Jacobson (1981) reports that 50% of the sampled voters recalled the incumbent's
name, while only 17% of the voters recalled the challenger's name. 40% of the voters
claimed that family or friends had contact with the incumbent. The same figure for the
challenger was only 11%.
13 In addition to the discussion in the introduction, Erikson and Palfrey (1998) and Samuels
(2001) show that the effectiveness of incumbent spending declines with seniority, giving
further evidence for the hypothesis that themarginal benefit of spending declineswith name
recognition.
14 Palda (1992) shows that the larger the government wealth in control of the
politician and the more power the politician has over the state budget, the more
money the politician raises for his campaign. Hall and Wayman (1990) show that
politicians with positions of power in congressional committees are better fundraisers.
15 If β1bβ2 and η1bη2 while η1/β1≥η2/β2, then by Lemma 3 Part (a) there is
incumbency advantage in the absence of a cap. Hence for the entire range of α∈ [(η2−
η1)/β2, η2/β2) specified in Result 2, there is incumbency advantage without a cap and
the imposition and/or the restriction of a binding cap increases the probability of
victory and the expected payoff of the incumbent. If β1bβ2 and η1bη2 while η1/β1bη2/
β2, then there is incumbency advantage without a cap for α specified by Lemma 3 Part
(b). The intersection of the range of α specified by Lemma 3 Part (b) and the range of α
specified in Result 2 yields a∈ max η2−η2β2 ;
η2
β2
η2
β2
− η1β1
  1=2 	
; η2β2
 	
. In this range there
is incumbency advantage in the absence of a cap and the imposition and/or the
restriction of a binding cap increases the probability of victory and the expected payoff
of the incumbent.
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incumbency advantage, prob1>1/2, if:
(a)
η1
β1
≥ η2
β2
(b)
η1
β1
<
η2
β2
and α ∈ η2
β2
η2
β2
− η1
β1
 	 	1=2
;
η2
β2
 !
Proof. Appendix.
If the cost of raising funds for one effective unit of spending is lower for
the incumbent, η1/β1≥η2/β2, then without a cap there is incumbency
advantage in the contest, however small voters' predisposition for the
incumbent may be. If the cost of raising funds for one effective unit of
spending is lower for the challenger, then there is incumbency advantage
without a cap only if the incumbent's initial voter disposition advantage is
sufficiently high. In both these cases, in the absence of a binding spending
limit the playing field is not level. It is tilted in favor of the incumbent.
Beforewemove on to the analysis of the effect of a spending limit on
the probability of victory of the incumbent, it may be helpful to present
themain intuition driving the results: Whether or not the imposition of
a spending limit can help to level the playing field depends on the
identity of the candidate whose supremum of the support of his
equilibrium mixed strategy is higher in the absence of a cap. As long as
one candidate as a higher supremum spending in equilibrium hewould
be restricted by the introduction of a barely binding cap whereas the
rivalwould not be effectively constrained. Hence the rivalwould benefit
from the imposition of a barely binding cap. If the incumbent's
supremum of the support of his no-cap equilibrium mixed strategy is
higher than the challenger's, the imposition of a limit can help reduce
the probability of victory of the incumbent. Otherwise the limit
increases the probability of victory of the incumbent.
In this subsection we present three results exploring the implica-
tions of the equilibrium. Each result is followed by a short discussion
onwhether a campaign spending limit can level the playingfieldwhen
there is incumbency advantage in the absence of a cap.
Result 1. If η1≥η2, then imposing a binding spending cap and/or making a
binding capmore restrictive increases the probability of victory and expected
payoff for the incumbent as long as the incumbent has any initial voter-
disposition advantage, however small:
Δ Prob1
Δk
<0 and
ΔEV1
Δk
<0. This
result holds regardless of the candidates' relative fundraising abilities. A
more restrictive cap reduces expectedaggregate spending,
ΔE a1 + a2ð Þ
Δk
>0.
Proof. Appendix.
This result holds whether or not there is incumbency advantage in
the absence of a spending limit. If the incumbent is more effective in
campaign spending the imposition of a spending limit and/or the
tightening of the limit further, always increases the probability of
victory of the incumbent. On the positive side, the limit succeeds in
reducing expected aggregate spending.
If η1≥η2, without a spending cap either Proposition 1 or 2 may
apply depending on the candidates' relative efficiency in fundraising.
However with a binding cap Candidate 1 is strong, so Proposition 1
applies regardless of relative fundraising efficiency. Since the
incumbent is more efficient in converting spending into votes and
he has an initial voter disposition advantage, the challenger must
spend more than the incumbent in order to effectively match his
score, M2(a1)>a1. With or without a cap, the supremum of the
support of equilibrium mixed strategy of Candidate 2 is higher than
the supremum of the incumbent's. Hence the cap restricts the
challenger while the incumbent is effectively unrestricted. This
advantage allows the incumbent to capture a positive expected payoff
from the contest equal to 1−β1M1(k) (see Proposition 1 part a). The
challenger becomes more constrained as the cap becomes morerestrictive which is to the advantage of the incumbent who is popular
a priori. This decreases the overall aggressiveness of the challenger,
which in turn induces less aggressive spending from the incumbent,
leading to decreased expected aggregate spending. With a more
restrictive cap, the incumbent's probability of winning goes up and
expected total campaign spending goes down.
This result is different from Proposition 6 in Meirowitz (2008)
where there is no initial voter disposition advantage. Meirowitz
(2008) finds that the cap benefits the challenger when the candidates
only differ in efficiency of fundraising as long as voters resolve ties in
favor of the challenger. Without an initial voter disposition advantage,
candidates tie when they both spend at the limit. This is not the case
with α>0, even if η1=η2 as in Meirowitz (2008). We find that the a
priori popular incumbent with η1≥η2, always benefits from the cap,
irrespective of the candidates' relative fundraising efficiency, because
the cap only effectively restricts his rival.
The main argument of the proponents of spending limits is that caps
put candidates with lesser means on an equal footing. The main
argument of opponents is that caps limit challenger's ability to overcome
incumbent's head start with the voters. Result 1 shows that if η1≥η2, the
argument of the opponents of caps always trumps themain argument in
favor of caps. No matter how dramatic the difference in fundraising
abilities, the cap always benefits the incumbent with the initial voter
disposition advantage, no matter how small that advantage may be.
Hence the primary argument in favor of caps needs qualifications at best.
In what follows we allow for η1bη2. Indeed there is vast empirical
evidence indicating that, controlling for candidate quality, challengers
tend to have higher effectiveness of campaign spending.13 Incum-
bents are already known by the electorate. However challengers often
must still establish name recognition. This provides an additional
benefit to campaigning for challengers.
In addition to the initial voter disposition advantage, incumbents also
tend to have higher efficiency in fundraising since they are in a position to
deliver political favors to donors. Hence we discuss the equilibrium
implications forβ2>β1.14Note that this captures the sourceof asymmetry
that forms the main argument made in favor of spending caps.
Result 2. If β1 b β2 and η1bη2 , and the incumbent has a large initial
voter disposition advantage, α∈ η2−η1
β2
;
η2
β2Þ


, the imposition of a
binding campaign spending cap and/or making a binding cap more
restrictive increases the probability of victory and the expected payoff of
the incumbent and reduces expected spending,
Δ Prob1
Δk
<0 and
ΔEV1
Δk
< 0
and
ΔE a1 + a2ð Þ
Δk
<0 .
Proof. Appendix.
For the empirically relevant parameter values where there is
incumbency advantage without a cap, Result 2 shows that a spending
cap does not achieve its stated aim.15 A cap exacerbates incumbency
17 Result 3 also holds for alternative contest success functions which yield
equilibrium in pure strategies. For instance consider the natural head-start advantage
extension of the Tullock (1980) contest success function used in Konrad (2002) where
player i's probability of victory is si/(si+sj) and s is the candidate's score: s1=α+η1a1
and s2=η2a2. If all spending is banned the challenger would have no opportunity to
compete with the incumbent's initial voter disposition advantage. Hence relaxing the
cap would provide an opportunity for the challenger to compete and thus increase his
probability of victory. If there were no cap on spending, the candidates' Kuhn–Tucker
conditions (requiring ai≥0) yield positive spending if αbη2/β2. In equilibrium
a1 = β2η1η2 = β1η2 + β2η1ð Þ2
h i
−(α/η1) and a2 = β1η1η2 = β1η2 + β2η1ð Þ2
h i
. There-
fore in the absence of a spending limit a1>a2 if α<
β2−β1ð Þη21η2
β1η2 + β2η1ð Þ2
. In this case the
26 I. Pastine, T. Pastine / Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 20–32advantage; It gives a boost to the incumbent, making it less likely for
the challenger to win the election. However, a more restrictive cap
does help reduce expected aggregate spending.
In the range of α specified in Result 2, Proposition 1 applies with
and without a spending cap. The large initial voter disposition
advantage overwhelms the challenger's higher effectiveness in
spending. Even though the challenger is more efficient in spending,
he starts out so far behind (due to the large α) that he must outspend
his rival in order to catch up. The campaign spending cap limits his
ability to do so. The supremum of the support of challenger's
equilibrium mixed strategy exceeds that of the incumbent's since
the challenger needs to spend more than the incumbent to overcome
the large initial voter disposition advantage. A binding cap restricts
Candidate 2 but does not effectively restrict Candidate 1. The expected
spending of Candidate 2 decreases which allows the incumbent to
relax and the incumbent's expected spending decreases, as well. This
leads to an increase in the expected payoff of the contest to the
incumbent. Themore restrictive the ceiling, the higher is the expected
payoff and the probability of victory of the incumbent.
Under the parameter values of Results 1 and 2, limits not only fail to
improve fairness in the elections but they also give an additional hand to
the incumbents who are already advantaged. Looking at the Canadian
case, Palda and Palda (1985) suggest that “[t]he legislation of ceilings
seems a reasonable democratic exercise. Yet it is curious that such a law
should have found the support of somany holders of elected office. It is,
after all, incumbentswhoapparently stand to benefit least froma cap on
their spending. Nevertheless, it is from incumbents at federal and
provincial levels, andwithout obvious pressure from the public, that the
impetus for these laws has come.” The cap does not achieve its stated
aim. It increases incumbency advantage. However, as Result 3 below
shows the cap candecrease incumbency advantage if the incumbent has
a mild initial voter disposition advantage and the cap is not too
restrictive. When the cap is not binding the incumbent is strong.
However with a moderate binding cap the challenger captures the
strong position. And with a very restrictive cap, the initial voter
disposition advantage overwhelms the effectiveness advantage of the
challenger and the incumbent captures the strong position.
Result 3. If β1bβ2 and η1bη2, and the incumbent has a mild initial voter
disposition advantage, α∈ η2
β2
− η1
β1
;
η2−η1
β2
 	
, as long as the cap is
moderate k>
α
η2−η1
, the imposition of a cap and/or making a binding cap
more restrictive decreases incumbent's probability of victory and
expected payoff. But imposing a very restrictive cap, k<
α
η2−η1
, or
making such a cap more restrictive, benefits the incumbent both in the
win probability and in the expected payoff. The effect of a spending limit
on expected spending is non-monotonic as well.
Proof. Appendix.
For a subset of parameter values in Result 3, there is incumbency
advantage in the absence of a spending limit.16 When there is
incumbency advantage without a cap, a more restrictive cap can
reduce the probability of victory of the incumbent as long as the cap is
moderate. However a very restrictive cap enhances the electoral
prospects of the incumbent.
To prove Result 3, the appendix establishes that: (a) The
introduction of a barely binding spending limit leads to a jump16 If β1bβ2 and η1bη2 while η1/β1≥ η2/β2, then by Lemma 3 Part (a) there is
incumbency advantage in the absence of a cap ∀α∈(0,η2/β2). If β1bβ2 and η1bη2 while
η1/β1bη2/β2, then there is incumbency advantage without a cap for α specified by
Lemma 3 Part (b) which is a subset of the range of α specified in Result 3. To see this
note that
η2
β2
− η1
β1
 	
b
η2
β2
η2
β2
− η1
β1
 	 	1 =2
b
η2−η1
β2
if
β2−β1
β1
>
η2−η1ð Þ
η2
, i.e. if the
fundraising advantage of the incumbent is significant in comparison to the effective
spending advantage of the challenger.down in the incumbent's probability of victory and in his expected
payoff and it leads to a jump up in expected total campaign spending.
(b) As long as the limit is moderate, a more restrictive limit causes a
decrease in the incumbent's probability of victory, an increase in the
challenger's expected payoff and a decrease in expected total
spending. (c) A reduction in the limit from α/(η2 – η1)+ to α/(η2 –
η1)– leads to a jump up in the incumbent's probability of victory, in his
expected payoff and in his expected campaign spending. Further
reductions in the spending limit decrease both candidates' expected
spending but increase the incumbent's expected payoff and proba-
bility of victory.
For parameter values specified in Result 3 Figs. 3–5 graph
candidates' expected payoffs, their expected campaign spending and
the challenger's probability of victory as a function of the level of the
cap.
The identity of the strong candidate depends on the level of the
cap. When the cap is not binding, the incumbent is the strong
candidate and Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium. When the cap
is binding at a moderate level, the playing field is tilted in favor of the
challenger who is more effective in campaign spending and the
equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 2. With a tight spending
ceiling, it is the incumbentwho captures the strong position due to his
initial voter disposition advantage and the equilibrium is once again
given by Proposition 1 (see Lemma 2).
The supremum of the support of the incumbent's no-cap
equilibrium mixed strategy is higher than of the challenger's,
M1
1
β2
 	
>
1
β2
, since the incumbent needs to be aggressive in order
to overcome the superior campaign spending effectiveness of the
challenger. Hence when the ceiling becomes barely binding, the limit
restricts the incumbent but does not effectively restrict the challenger.
Since the incumbent is restricted by the cap, the challenger can
guarantee a win by exceeding the supremum score of the incumbent.
This drives the expected payoff of the incumbent down to zero
(Fig. 3), and yields a positive expected payoff for the challenger. The
imposition of the ceiling changes the identity of the strong candidate.
The cap tilts the playing field in favor of the challenger which makes
the challenger more aggressive in campaign spending; resulting in a
jump up in the expected spending of the challenger (Fig. 4). This
yields a jump up in the probability that the challenger wins (Fig. 5).
The imposition of the spending cap benefits the challenger.17
As long as the cap is moderate, a further decrease in the spending
cap leads to a decline in expected spending of both candidates and the
expected payoff of the challenger goes up. Just at k=α/(η2−η1)
however, the identity of the strong candidate switches from the
challenger to the incumbent. Even though the challenger is moreimposition of a barely binding cap directly affects only Candidate 1. The effect on
Candidate 2 through Candidate 1's spending is of second order. Hence a barely binding
cap would increase the expected value and probability of victory of Candidate 2. The
above yields a condition analogous to the condition in Result 3. If β1bβ2, α is
sufficiently small, then the initial imposition of the limit will increase the probability
that the challenger wins, but a complete ban on spending will guarantee victory for
the incumbent. However, when β1≥β2 and/or when α is sufficiently large, in the
absence of a spending limit a1ba2. Then the imposition of a barely binding limit
restricts the challenger which benefits the incumbent, suggesting that results
analogous to Results 1 and 2 continue to hold in this environment.
Fig. 3. Expected payoffs of incumbent and challenger.
Fig. 4. Expected spending of incumbent and challenger.
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up with rival's initial voter disposition advantage. The playing field
tilts in favor of the incumbent which induces more aggressive
campaign spending of the incumbent.
For the parameter values in Result 3, when there is incumbency
advantage in the absence of a cap, with a moderate cap the probability
that the challenger wins exceeds 1/2. Whether this theoretical
prediction is empirically relevant depends on the interpretation of
the source of asymmetry in spending effectiveness. The only source of
advantage for the challenger that can help him to catch up with the
incumbent's head-start advantage is the challenger's superior
campaign spending effectiveness. The challenger may have higher
spending effectiveness because campaign spending has the additional
benefit of establishing name recognition while the incumbent already
enjoys name recognition. Under this interpretation of the source of
the challenger's spending efficiency, it is not believable that he would
have a greater than 1/2 chance of victory. At best he would be able to
catch up to the incumbent. Once he establishes the same level of name
recognition his efficiency of spending would be the same as the
incumbent's. Hence this counterintuitive prediction is due to the
linear technology of spending effectiveness. In order to capture this
interpretation of asymmetry in campaign spending, one would need
to specify a technology with decreasing returns.18
However under other interpretations for the source of the
asymmetry in spending effectiveness a greater than 1/2 chance of
winning for the challenger may be plausible. For example, the
incumbent has pre-established impressions in voters' minds over
the years he has been in office whereas the challenger is a blank page.
Changing people's minds may be harder than creating a first
impression.19 With this interpretation for the asymmetry in η, the
challenger may capture the strong position with a higher chance of
victory if the head-start advantage is not too severe.
Finally, if the incumbent's initial voter disposition advantage is
small, α ∈ 0; η2
β2
− η1
β1
 	
, without a spending limit the spending
effectiveness advantage of the challenger overwhelms the initial
voter disposition advantage and the fundraising efficiency advantage
of the incumbent (see Lemma 1 part a). In this case, without a
spending limit, the challenger has a higher probability of winning.18 Alternatively one may consider a strictly increasing concave score function. Pastine
and Pastine (2011) provide payoff characterization of constrained all-pay contests
allowing for general score functions. The player with the highest reach, i.e. the highest
feasible score at which his valuation for winning is non-negative, captures positive
expected payoff. And the other player has an expected payoff equal to zero. Hence the
form of the score function is irrelevant for the expected payoff results. However there
are no general results so far on the win probability and on expected spending for
constrained all-pay contests with concave score functions.
19 The Democratic Party primary elections in 2008 between Senators Hillary Clinton
and Barack Obama may be a good example of this.This violates the empirical regularity that incumbents tend to have a
higher probability of victory than challengers when there is no
spending limit.
4.2. Candidate quality
In the discussion above we examined the effect of a spending limit
on incumbency advantage unhampered by candidate quality differ-
ences where candidate asymmetries were driven by incumbency
status only. Now we briefly consider spending limits where
candidates differ in quality and the key parameters of the model
reflect candidate quality unhampered by incumbency status. Many
desirable candidate qualities such as leadership skills and the ability
to persuade people, improve the campaign spending effectiveness of a
candidate. Experience in public service and previous accomplish-
ments may also be associated with candidate quality and they tend to
improve name recognition. Hence campaign spending effectiveness
and favorable initial voter disposition are likely to be positively
correlated with candidate quality. The relation between candidate
quality and fundraising efficiency is not as clear-cut. While a high-
quality candidate is likely to be good fundraiser due to effective
communication skills, a self-serving low-quality candidate may have
an easy time raising funds from special interest groups in return for
political favors. However, the following Corollary to Result 1 holds
irrespective of how quality affects fundraising efficiency.
Denote the high-quality candidate as H and the low-quality
candidate as L, where ηH>ηL and H enjoys the initial voter disposition
advantage.
Corollary to Result 1. In a contest for an open seat, if ηH>ηL and H has
initial voter disposition advantage α ∈ 0; ηL
βL
 	
, the probability of victory
and the expected payoff of the high-quality candidate always improvedue to
the imposition of a binding campaign spending limit and/or making aFig. 5. Challenger's probability of victory.
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Δ ProbH
Δk
<0 and
ΔEVH
Δk
< 0. Expected
spending always decreases with a more restrictive cap,
ΔE aH + aLð Þ
Δk
> 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Result 1 where H=1 and L=2.
Since the high-quality candidate is more effective in campaign
spending, one might think that a spending cap would hinder his
ability to take full-advantage of his campaign spending efficiency.
However, in equilibrium the cap is beneficial for the high-quality
candidate. This result holds even if the high-quality candidate is less
efficient in fundraising. His initial voter disposition advantage and
superior campaign spending effectiveness allows the high-quality
candidate to capture the strong position while the low-quality
candidate has to spend more than the high-quality candidate to
effectively match his score. With or without a spending cap, the
supremum of the support of the low-quality candidate's equilibrium
mixed strategy is higher than the supremum of the high-quality
candidate's. Hence the imposition of a binding spending cap restricts
the low-quality candidate while the high quality candidate is
effectively not restricted. This leads to an increase in the win
probability of the high-quality candidate. With a more restrictive
cap the playing field is tilted in favor of the high-quality candidate and
the low-quality candidate becomes less aggressive which, in turn,
reduces the expected spending of the high-quality candidate, as well.
The above result is very promising for the welfare effects of
campaign spending limits for open-seat contests. However the
number of open-seat contests compared to the total number of
contests is usually very small. Only about ten percent of US House
contests from 1998 to 2004 were for an open seat. The figure was
about 15% in the same time period for Canadian MP elections where
spending limits were in place.20
Result 4. When a candidate has strictly positive expected payoff with a
binding campaign spending cap, his marginal benefit to candidate quality
decreases with a more restrictive cap as long as candidate quality
improves effectiveness of campaign spending.
Proof. Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. A candidate can make better use
of his quality induced campaign effectiveness if he is allowed to spend
more. In the bigger picture, this suggests that a more restrictive
binding cap may make it less attractive for the political candidate to
invest in quality building activities such as improving his expertise in
history, economics, and philosophy or participating in public speech
and leadership skill training seminars.
The political science literature points to some potentially positive
effects of campaign spending limits on politician quality. If the
campaign spending limit can level the playing field by reducing
incumbency advantage, a challenger who is of higher quality than the
incumbent can have a greater chance of victory. Also, in a dynamic
context this may induce higher quality candidates to challenge the
incumbent in the first place.21 This line of reasoning suggests that
whenever spending limits reduce incumbency advantage they will
increase candidate quality.
However the implication of Result 4 is that this is not necessarily
the case. Result 4 identifies an additional channel for the effect of
spending limits on candidate quality. As long as quality improves
campaigning effectiveness, a more restrictive binding limit may give a
smaller incentive to invest in quality and hence produce lower quality
politicians.20 For US statistics see Duquette et al. (2008). For Canadian data see http://www.
punditsguide.ca/files/Incumbency_Table1.html.
21 Levitt and Wolfram (1997) show that incumbency advantage deters high-quality
challengers.5. Discussion
5.1. Do limits help level the playing field?
The main stated objective of political campaign spending limits is
to level the playing field which is otherwise tilted in favor of the
incumbent. Employing data on Canadian Federal elections, Milligan
and Rekkas (2008) show that smaller limits lead to closer elections.
This is encouraging. However our model suggests that transfer of
policy recommendations from one political environment to the next
may be problematic. The effect of a spending limit is likely to depend
on the political institutional framework. In parliamentary systems
with party discipline (such as in Canada, Brazil etc.) incumbents often
do not enjoy the same degree of name recognition as US Senators, see
Samuels (2001). Hence, the initial voter disposition advantage is likely
to vary across political systems. While in Canada limits may help
challengers, they might benefit incumbents in the US where in-
cumbents typically enjoy a large initial voter disposition advantage
(Results 2 and 3 combined).5.2. Do limits increase electoral prospects of small parties?
A policy report by Phillips (2007) on strengthening democracy
commissioned by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair suggests
that “[l]owering the national expenditure limit for campaigning may
help small and new parties to compete with the two principal
established parties.” The model may help shed some light to this
discussion. If the larger party can be assumed to enjoy a head-start
advantage in initial voter disposition, the smaller party may need to
spend more in order to win the election. In contrast to the claim
above, Results 1 and 2 suggest that a cap on campaign expenditure
may in fact benefit the larger party rather than the smaller party.
Furthermore Result 3 suggests that even if the existing cap benefits
smaller parties, it does not necessarily follow that further lowering the
limit will have the same effect.5.3. Do limits reduce the time and effort spent for fundraising?
Running for elections is an expensive endeavor. The need to raise
funds may take time away from other duties and raises the concern
that legislative outcomes may be driven by money. If limits can help
reduce expected campaign spending, they may help to improve the
quality of democracy. Gross et al. (2002) find that in the U.S. from
1978 to 1997 in Gubernatorial elections, the existence of voluntary
spending caps accompanied by public funding reduced the expected
spending of both the incumbent and the challenger. Palda and Palda
(1985) employ cross-sectional data from 95 constituencies of Ontario
in the 1979 Canadian Federal Elections. The study finds that a $1
increase in the limit lead to a $0.58 increase in candidate expenditure.
While empirical evidence seems to be in favor of limits due to a
reduction in campaign spending, the implications of the model call for
caution. The effect of a limit on expected spending is shown to be non-
monotonic (Fig. 4) when the initial voter disposition advantage of the
incumbent is mild. When the limit changes the identity of the strong
candidate, the previously weak candidate can become more aggres-
sive in his spending in a favorable playing field.22 Contrary to one of its
intended consequences, the campaign spending limit legislation may
yield increased effort for fundraising and open the door wider for
monied interest's influence in policy making.22 Che and Gale (1998) and Pastine and Pastine (2010) have results on expected
aggregate contributions with similar intuition for contribution caps.
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It is often feared that incumbency advantage degrades robust
competition. When the playing field is not level, the incumbent may
be less responsive to his constituents since he would have little reason
to fear defeat; A higher quality challenger may have a lower
probability of victory; The incumbent may be not challenged in the
first place. Proponents of spending limits claim that limits can help
level the playing field. However opponents suggest that the in-
cumbents would not have legislated limits if limits did not benefit
incumbents. This paper examines the effect of a spending limit on
incumbency advantage in a contest where campaign spending serves
as persuasive advertising. It also provides an analysis of the impact of
spending limits on expected spending.
The arguments for and against spending limits are based on three
sources of asymmetry between the incumbents and challengers;
initial voter disposition advantage, fundraising efficiency, campaign
spending effectiveness. When all three sources of asymmetry coexist,
we find that the limit increases the challenger's probability of victory
only when the following three conditions are jointly satisfied; the
challenger is more effective in campaign spending, the incumbent has
a mild initial voter disposition advantage and the limit is moderate. In
all other cases the limit gives an additional tilt to the already uneven
playing field in favor of the incumbent.
We also identify a new channel through which limits may affect
candidate quality. If quality improves the effectiveness of campaign
spending, a more restrictive binding limit on spending may lower the
candidates' incentive to invest in quality.
Finally we show that spending limits may have the unintended
consequence of increasing expected campaign spending. The limit can
change the competitive balance giving the previously weak candidate
an incentive to spendmore aggressively.While out of the scope of this
paper, it is often argued that increased campaign spending financed
by campaign contributions may lead to greater policy influence of
special interest groups.
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Appendix A
We consider cases where there is competition in equilibrium:
αbη2/β2 and k>α/η2. We omit the non-generic case where k=
Mi (k)≤min (1/β1,1/β2). Let S and W refer to the strong and weak
candidates.
Claim 1. Candidate W does not put a probability mass point on any level of
spending greater than zero. Candidate S does not put a probabilitymass point
on any level of spending aS ∈(0, MS(aW)). There is no equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof. Suppose thatW's lowestmass point in (0, aW) is a′.MS (a
0
)>aS
conflicts with the definition of the weak candidate. If MS (a
0)baS or if
MS (a
0
)=aS and k>1/βS then Swould not spendMS(a
0
) or in the open
interval below it as a slight increase in spending to just above MS(a')
would result in a discrete increase in his probability of winning.
Therefore W could decrease spending slightly from a′ with no
decrease in his probability of winning.
The only remaining possibility is that MS(a
0)=aS=k. If a
0
baW bk
then MW(aS)baW a contradiction of the definition of S. Suppose that
a
0 =aW =1/βWbk. S will put no mass in the open interval below k as
moving it up to k results in a discrete increase in the probability of
winning. If S put no probability mass at k then W could reducespending from a′ with no loss. If S did put mass at k thenWwould not
win with certainty at a′=1/βW and so it would result in a negative
expected payoff. a
0
=aW =k results in the non-generic case where
k=Mi(k) and is therefore omitted. The symmetric argument
establishes that S can have no mass point on a ∈(0, MS (aW)).
Candidate W cannot have a mass point on any positive level of
spending. If in a pure-strategy equilibrium W had zero spending, S's
optimal response would be aS0 =max(0, MS (0)+ε). However in this
caseWwould preferMW (aS0 )+ε>0. Both of these levels of spending
are affordable and possible since α>η2/β2 and k>α/η2. Hence there is
no equilibrium in pure strategies. □
Claim 2. Candidate 2 puts zero probability on a2∈(0, α/η2].
Proof. Zero spendingwins with the same probability as a2∈(0, α/η2).
Candidate 2 wins with a2=α/η2 only if a1=0. Either this chance is
small enough that his expected value is negative, in which case he
would prefer zero spending, or a slight increase in his spending would
result in a discrete increase in his probability of winning. □
Claim 3. Candidate W has an infimum spending level of zero, aWinf=0
and EVW=0.
Proof. Suppose aWinf=0. If MS(aWinf)>0 then Candidate 1 would never
choose aS∈(0,MS(aWinf)) as Swould be putting in positive spending and
would lose for sure since the probability ofW having spending of aWinf is
zero by Claim 1. Claim 1 also implies that the probability of S choosing
exactly MS(aWinf) is zero, therefore W could lower his spending without
changing his probability of winning. IfMS(aWinf)b0 then spending of zero
would give W the same probability of winning as the conjectured
aW
inf>0, a contradiction. If MS(aWinf)=0 then S=1 and aWinf=α/η2. By
Claim 2 the probability of 2 having spending of α/η2 is zero. Hence
if a2inf=α/η2 Candidate 2 is mixing in the open interval above α/η2. In
this case 1 would put no probability at zero spending by the above
argument and by Claim 1 Candidate 1 has nomass point on (0, ε]. Hence
2's probability of winning with spending of M2 εð Þ = α=η2ð Þþ is
approximately zero for small ε. So with spending M2(ε) Candidate 2 is
putting in positive spending for a negligible probability of winning,
hence a2inf≠α/η2. a2inf∈(0, α/η2) is not possible by Claim 2 so 2's
infimum spending must be zero. So in all cases aWinf=0.
Zero is in the support ofW's mixed strategy. IfW=2 then he loses
with certainty with that spending so EVW = 0. IfW=1 then, from the
definition of W, a1 bM1(a2), so 2 will not choose zero spending as he
would lose for sure and he can guarantee victory and a positive payoff
with spending ofM2 a1ð Þ. By Claim 2 there is zero probability of a2∈(0,
α/η2] so 1 has zero probability of winning with zero spending. Since
aW
inf=0 and W=1, EVW = 0. □
Claim 4. Candidate W has a supremum spending of aWsup=aW while
Candidate S has a supremum spending of aS
sup=MS (aW) and EVS=1 –
βSMS (aW)≥0, with equality only if a1=M1 (a2).
Proof. aWsup=0 is not possible by Claim 1. If a
sup
W ∈ 0; aWð Þ then Swould
never set aS>max(0, MS(aWsup)) since S can win for sure with that
spending as the probability of W choosing aWsup is zero by Claim 1.
Therefore W could win for sure with spending aWsup+ε yielding a
positive payoff for small enough ε, a contradiction of Claim 3. Likewise
aS
supbMS(aWsup) allows candidate W an opportunity to guarantee a
positive payoff and hence contradicts Claim 3. Candidate S can win for
sure with spending ofMS (aWsup) so aSsup=MS (aW) and EVS=1 – βSMS
(aW). By the definition of aS this is strictly greater than zero whenever
aS>MS (aW) and equal to zero if aS=MS (aW). □
Claim 5. For Candidate 1 spending levels almost everywhere on a1∈(0,
a1
sup) and for Candidate 2 spending levels almost everywhere on
a2∈(α/η2, a2sup) must have positive probability.
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Candidate 2 had zero probability of spending in (t, v). Then 1 would
have zero probability of spending on (M1 (t), M1 (v)) since he could
lower his spending toM1 (t) and have the same chance of winning by
Claim 2. But in this case 2 would never have spending of v+ε as he
could lower his spending to t, saving v+ε− t in spending and losing
only F1(M1(v+ε))−F1(M1(v)) in probability of winning. By Claim 1
this loss in probability is negligible for small ε. So if there were an
interval of zero probability it must go all the way up to ausup, which
contradicts Claim 4. A symmetric argument rules out ranges of zero
probability for Candidate 1 on (0, a1sup). □
Proof of Lemma 1. From Claim 4, aWsup=aW and aSsup=MS (aW).With
any non-binding cap aW =1/βW hence a non-binding cap requires
k>max (1/βW, MS (1/βW)). S=2 requires a1bM1 (a2) which implies
M2 (a1)b a2. So from Eq. (2), M2 (1/β1)b1/β2. Eq. (3) yields
α b
η2
β2
− η1
β1
which completes part (a). S=1 requires a1≥M1 (a2) so
from Eq. (2), 1/β1 ≥ M1 (1/β2). Eq. (3) yields α ≥
η2
β2
− η1
β1
which
completes part (b). □
Proof of Lemma 2. From Claim 4, asupS = MS aWð Þ and asupW = aW =
min 1 = βW ; kð Þ. Suppose asupW = aW = k, hence aSsup=MS(k). This
must be less than k by the definition of S. Thus for S=2 in equilibrium,
M2 (k)bkwhich yields (η2 – η1)k>αwhich gives part (b). For S=1 in
equilibrium M1 (k)bk, noting that we are not considering the non-
generic special case where M1(k)=k, which yields (η2−η1)kbα
which gives the result in part (a) as long as k>1/βW.
If k>1/βW then for the cap to be binding aSsup=MS(1/βW)=
k≤1/βS. From the definition of S, aS≥Ms(aW) with equality only if
S=1. Hence the only possibility for a binding cap with k>1/βW is
k=M1(1/β2), in which case a1=M1(a2). Therefore k =
η2
β2
−α
 	
η1 >
1
β2
which implies α< η2−η1ð Þ 1β2 < η2−η1ð Þk which completes
the proof of part (a). □
Proof of Lemma 3. Without a binding cap, if
η2
β2
≤ η1
β1
, then (b) in
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 apply and prob1 = 1−
1
2
β2β1η2
η1 ½ 1β22−
α
η2
 	2 since a2 = 1 = β2, prob1>1/2 ∀α∈ 0; η2β2
 	
. If
η2
β2
>
η1
β1
, (a) in
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 apply when α∈ 0; η2
β2
− η1
β1
Þ

and prob1 =
1
2
β2η1
β1η2
since a1 = 1/β1, prob1 b
1
2
: Hence there is no
incumbency advantage. When α∈ η2
β2
− η1
β1
;
η2
β2 Þ


, (b) in Lemma 1
and Proposition 1 apply and prob1 = 1−
1
2
β2β1η2
η1
1
β22
− α
η2
 	2" #
since a2 = 1= β2. In this case, there is an incumbency advantage,
prob1 >
1
2
if α∈ η2
β2
η2
β2
− η1
β1
 	 	1=2
;
η2
β2
 !
. □
Proof of Proposition 1. Claims 2–5 demonstrate that in equilibrium
2 is indifferent among all spending levels almost everywhere on
f0g∪ α = η2; a2ð  and 1 is indifferent among spending levels almost
everywhere on 0;M1 a2ð Þ½ . EV2 = 0 by Claim 3. On a2∈ α = η2; a2ð Þ
Candidate 2 wins with probability F1(M1(a2)) as there is zero
probability that a1=M1(a2) by Claim 1. So indifference of 2
in that range implies F1(M1(a2))−β2a2=0. This yields F1(a1)=
β2(α+η1a1)/η2∀a1∈ 0;M1 a2ð Þ½ . Hence 1 has a probability mass of
αβ2 = η2 at zero and a mass in the open interval above M1 a2ð Þ of
1−β2a2. Note that this mass is zero if the cap is not binding.
EV1 = 1−β1M1 a2ð Þ≥0 by Claim 4. On a1∈ 0;M1 a2ð Þð Þ Candidate 1
wins with probability F2(M2(a1)) as there is zero probabilitythat a2=M2(a1) by Claim 1. So the indifference of 1 in that
range implies F2 M2 a1ð Þð Þ−β1a1 = 1−β1M1 a2ð Þ. This yields F2 a2ð Þ =
1 + β1η2 a2−a2ð Þ= η1∀a2∈ α = η2; a2ð . 2 has a probability mass of
1−β1η2a2 = η1 at zero spending. By Claim 2 Candidate 2 puts zero
probability on (0, α/η2).
Part (a) Expected value: Given by Claims 3 and 4. Part (b) Expected
spending: On a2∈ α = η2; a2ð  the p.d.f. of 2's spending is f2(a2)=
β1η2/η1. Hence his expected spending is E a2ð Þ = ∫ a2a=η2 f2 xð Þxdx. On
a1∈(0, M1(a2)] the p.d.f. of 1's spending is f1(a1)=β2η1/η2 and 1 in
the open interval above M1(a2). Hence his expected spending is
E a1ð Þ = ∫ M1 a2ð Þ0 f1 xð Þxdx + 1−F1 M1 a2ð Þð Þ½ M1 a2ð Þ. Part (c) Probability
Candidate 2 wins: In equilibrium there is zero probability of ties where
a2=M1(a2) by Claim 1 so the probability that 2 wins is given by
prob2 = ∫a2a=η2 F1 M1 xð Þð Þf2 xð Þdx. □
Proof of Proposition 2. Claims 2–5 demonstrate that in equilibrium
2 is indifferent among all spending levels almost everywhere on (a/η2,
M2(a1)] and 1 is indifferent among spending levels almost every-
where on 0; a1½ . EV1 = 0 by Claim 3. On a1∈ [0, a1) Candidate 1
wins with probability F2(M2(a1)) as there is zero probability
that a2=M2(a1) by Claim 1. So indifference of 1 in that range
implies F2(M2(a1))−β1a1=0. This yields F2(a2)=β1(η2a2−α)/
η1∀a2∈ α = η2;M2 a1ð Þð . Hence 2 has no probability on [0, α/η2] and a
probability mass in the open interval above Ms(a1) of 1−β1a1. Note
that this mass is zero if the cap is not binding. EV2 = 1−β2M2 a1ð Þ≥0
by Claim 4. On a2∈ α = η2;M2 a1ð Þð Þ Candidate 2 wins with probability
F1(M1(a2)) as there is zero probability that a1=M1(a2) by Claim 1.
So the indifference of 2 in that range implies F1 M1 a2ð Þð Þ−β2a2 = 1−
β2M2 a1ð Þ. This yields F1 a1ð Þ = 1 + β2η1η2 a1−a1ð Þ∀a1∈ 0; a1½ . 1 has a
probability mass of 1−β2η1a1 = η2 at zero spending.
Part (a) Expected value: Given by Claims 3 and 4. Part (b) Expected
spending: On a2∈(a/η2, M2(a1)] the p.d.f. of 2's spending is f2(a2)=
β1η2/η1 and he has a probability mass in the open interval above
M2(a1). Hence his expected spending is E a2ð Þ = ∫ M2 a1ð Þα = η2 f2 xð Þxdx +
1−F2 M2 a1ð Þð Þ½ M2 a1ð Þ. On a1∈(0, a1] the p.d.f. of 1's spending is
f1(af)=β2η1/η2. Hence his expected spending is E a1ð Þ = ∫ a10 f1 xð Þxdx.
Part (c) Probability that Candidate 2 wins: In equilibrium there is zero
probability of ties where a2=M1(a2) by Claim 1 so the probability
that 2 wins is given by prob2 = 1−∫a10 F2 M2 xð Þð Þf1 xð Þdx. □
Proof of Result 1. Since η2≤η1, by Lemma 2 with a binding cap
Proposition 1 applies and hence
∂EV1
∂k =
−β1η2
η1
< 0 and
∂prob2
∂k =β1β2η2k
η1
> 0. By Lemma 1, if α∈ η2
β2
− η1
β1
;
η2
β2 Þ


then Proposition 1
applies without a cap as well and hence Proposition 1's subsections
also yield the result for the initial imposition of the cap.
If α<
η2
β2
− η1
β1
, which can occur if the challenger has a fundraising
advantage, then by Lemma 1 without a cap Proposition 2 applies and
hence the imposition of a cap switches the equilibrium from
Proposition 2 to Proposition 1. Nevertheless, from the subsections of
the propositions, without a cap EV1=0 while with a binding cap
EV1≥0. Without a binding cap a1 = 1 = β1 and hence prob1 =
1
2
β2η1
η2β1
whilewith a binding cap a2 = k so prob1 = 1−
1
2
β1β2η2
η1
k2− a
η2
 	2" #
.
Since η2≤η1,M2(1/β1)≥1/β1 so from Lemma 1 a barely binding cap has
k=M2(1/β1). From that and the fact that α<
η2
β2
− η1
β1
the incumbent's
probability of victory is higher with a barely binding cap than with no
cap on campaign spending. □
Proof of Result 2. Since β1bβ2,
η2−η1
β2
>
η2
β2
− η1
β1
so M1(1/β2)b
1/β2. From Lemma 1 part (b) a binding cap has k≤1/β2. Hence for any
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applies. In the absence of a binding cap a1 = 1= β1 and a2 = 1= β2.
Therefore α >
η2
β2
− η1
β1
implies a1 > M1 a2ð Þ and hence Proposition
1 applies without a cap as well. The subsections of Proposition 1 yield
the results.
Proof of Result 3. In the absence of a binding cap a1 = 1= β1 and
a2 = 1= β2. Therefore α≥
η2
β2
− η1
β1
implies a1≥M1 a2ð Þ and hence
Proposition 1 applies without a cap.
(a) The introductionof a barely binding limit. FromLemma1part (b) a
barely binding cap has k=max(1/β2, M1(1/β2)). Since αb(η2−η1)/β2,
k = M1 1 = β2ð Þ = η2β2−a
 
= η1. Therefore a1 = k, a2 = 1= β2 and
a1 bM1(a2) so with a barely binding cap Proposition 2 applies. Plugging
these values into the results in the subsections of Propositions 1 and 2 and
noting thatα >
η2
β2
− η1
β1
proves that the introductionof abarely binding
limit leads to a jumpdown in the probability that the incumbentwins and
a jump up in the expected total campaign spending.
(b) Making a moderate limit, k∈ aη2−η1 ;
1
η1
η2
β2
−α
  
, more restric-
tive. From the proof of part (a) and Lemma 2 in this range of k
Proposition 2 applies so its subsections and noting that a1 = k,
establishes that in this range of k, making the limit more restrictive
decreases the probability that the incumbent wins and decreases
expected total spending.
(c) Reducing the limit from
α
η2−η1
 	þ
to
α
η2−η1
 	−
. From the
proof of part (a) and the fact that αb(η2−η1)/β2 the cap is binding for
k =
α
η2−η1
 	þ
. From Lemma 2 when k>α/(η2−η1) Proposition 2
applies and a1 = k while when kbα/(η2−η1) Proposition 1 applies
and a2 = k. Taking left limit of the results in the subsections of
Proposition 2 and the right limit of the results in the subsections of
Proposition 1 as k→α/(η2−η1) and noting that αb(η2−η1)/β2 and
β1bβ2 establishes that reducing the limit from
α
η2−η1
 	þ
to
α
η2−η1
 	−
leads to an increase in the probability that the incumbent
wins and leads to an increase in the incumbent's k<
α
η2−η1
 	
,
Proposition 1 applies so its subsections show that further decreases
in kwill benefit the incumbent. □
Proof of Result 4. With a binding cap in Proposition 1 a1 = k, a2 =
η2k−αð Þ= η1<k;EV1 > 0, EV2 = 0. In that case ∂
2EV1
∂η1∂k
= β1η2 =
η21 > 0. With a binding cap in Proposition 2 a1 = k, a2 = η1k + αð Þ=
η2<k, EV1 = 0, EV2 > 0. In that case
∂2EV2
∂η2∂k
= β2η1 = η22 > 0. So the
result holds directly as long as the reduction in k does not
switch the equilibrium from one proposition to the other. From
Lemma 2 the only time this happens is when η2>η1 and k drops
from α = η2 > η1ð Þþ to α = η2 > η1ð Þ− and the equilibrium
switches from Proposition 2 to Proposition 1 and
∂EV2
∂η2
falls from
β2
η22
η1k + αð Þ > 0 to zero.
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